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TREBLE, TREBLE TOIL AND TROUBLE: THE NEW
PER SE RULE AS A PROTECTION AGAINST THE
CURSE OF THE “SUPREME EVIL”
SETH KONOPASEK*
ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court has called collusion between firms the
“supreme evil” of antitrust. Despite public and private enforcement
efforts, collusive firms and the cartels they form cost American
consumers billions of dollars a year and undermine the virtues of our
free market economy. The Chicago School theory of antitrust enforcement, which has dominated antitrust scholarship, vehemently
disapproves of private antitrust actions that enable plaintiffs to
recover treble damages. Recent scholarship, however, has rejected
the Chicago School’s concerns of overdeterrence and embraced
the treble damages remedy. This Note follows the recent scholarship and proposes the New Per Se Rule, which would impose per
se civil liability—including treble damages—on firms that are
criminally convicted of collusion and those firms’ executives, regardless of whether or not the executives are individually prosecuted or convicted. The New Per Se Rule will radically alter the
decision-making formulas of firms and their agents, likely transforming collusion from a rational and profitable business strategy
into an irrational and unprofitable one. More importantly, the New
Per Se Rule will strike at the root cause of collusion: firm executives.
The New Per Se Rule will make it irrational for firm executives to
engage in or allow the firm they command to engage in collusive
activity. Once collusion is irrational, the “supreme evil” will cease
to plague our economy.

Seth Konopasek will graduate from William & Mary Law School in 2021.
His interest in competition law stems from his time as an entrepreneur, where
he started an e-commerce business out of his college dorm.
*

497

498 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:497
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................ 499
I. THE REALITY OF COLLUSION AND ITS EFFECTS........................ 501
II. THE ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY THEORY OF CARTEL
ENFORCEMENT ......................................................................... 504
A. Economic Theory of Enforcement ...................................... 505
B. Criticisms of Private Actions ............................................. 508
III. EMERGING VIEWS ON CARTEL ENFORCEMENT ...................... 511
A. The Implicit Rejection of Landes’s Economic Efficiency
Theory .................................................................................. 511
B. New Appreciation of Private Actions................................. 514
IV. INTRODUCING THE NEW “PER SE” RULE ................................ 517
A. Increased Pn Value ............................................................ 518
B. Firms .................................................................................. 520
C. Individuals......................................................................... 523
V. THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE NEW PER SE RULE .... 526
A. Rejecting Landes’s Economic Efficiency Theory ............... 526
B. Focusing on the Root.......................................................... 527
C. Making Corporate Compliance Rational .......................... 529
D. Addressing Counterarguments ......................................... 532
CONCLUSION ............................................................................... 535

2021]

TREBLE, TREBLE TOIL AND TROUBLE

499

INTRODUCTION
As thunder cracks and a cauldron boils, the three Weird
Sisters chant in unison, “Double, double toil and trouble; Fire burn,
and cauldron bubble.”1 Given the animosity to antitrust class
action lawsuits that enable plaintiffs to recover treble damages,
it seems that many would not be surprised if plaintiff’s attorneys
followed a similar ritual, chanting “Treble, treble toil and trouble;
Fire burn, and profits bubble” before pulling yet another frivolous
complaint out from their diabolical cauldron.2 While the wisdom
of antitrust class actions is a subject of debate, their purpose is
clear: “the purpose of giving private parties treble-damage and injunctive remedies was not merely to provide private relief, but was
to serve as well the high purpose of enforcing the antitrust laws.”3
Chief among the antitrust laws is the Sherman Act, which
forbids “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States.”4 Through this language, the Sherman Act is designed to “prevent firms from stealing from consumers by charging
them supracompetitive prices.”5 The Supreme Court has also
recognized two other evils that arise from antitrust violations:
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act 2 sc. 1, l. 10–11.
One critic likened private antitrust suits to the “Salem Witch trials.” Abbott
B. Lipsky Jr., Before the Antitrust Modernization Commission: Private Damages Remedies: Treble Damages, Fee Shifting, Prejudgment Interest 4–5 (2005),
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/commission_hearings/pdf/Lipsky.pdf [https://
perma.cc/X633-7LJA]. For criticisms of private antitrust actions, see infra Section II.B.
3 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Rsch., Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130–31 (1969).
4 Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 1 (2012)).
5 Robert H. Lande, A Traditional and Textualist Analysis of the Goals of
Antitrust: Efficiency, Preventing Theft from Consumers, and Consumer Choice, 81
FORDHAM L. REV. 2349, 2351 (2013); see also Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs.
Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 724 (1988) (holding that interbrand competition is the
“‘primary concern of antitrust law’”) (quoting Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania
Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52 n.19 (1977)); Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States,
221 U.S. 1, 54–59 (1911) (determining that the policy purpose of the Sherman
Act was to ban restraints of trade that created higher prices and reduced
output); Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978)
(holding that the Sherman Act was passed because “ultimately competition
will produce not only lower prices, but also better goods and services.”).
1
2
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lower quality and lower quantities of products.6 By colluding with
each other, firms can bypass market competition and use the aggregate power of a cartel to fix prices, allocate markets, and rig
bids—acts that bring about these three evils so consistently that
they are illegal per se.7 Because of the power of cartels to impose
these evils, the Supreme Court has labeled collusion between firms
the “supreme evil” of antitrust.8
Although collusive firms, the “supreme evil,”9 are prosecuted by the Department of Justice and sued in private actions,
they continue to form and operate.10 Recent empirical reviews of
cartel incentives have found that the current level of punishment
for collusive behavior is vastly insufficient to deter corporations
from colluding and committing anticompetitive crimes.11 Thus,
firms collude because it “pays. In fact, it pays very well.”12 And it
pays at the cost of the consumer: cartels cost the economy billions of
dollars a year.13 Given the enormous cost imposed by collusive
behavior, it is nearly universally agreed that cartels should be
policed and punished.14 And to be sure, they are.15 But if we want
to be free from the evils cartels impose, we need to police and
punish corporate collusion more effectively.16 This Note proposes
See, e.g., Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 52; Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Eng’rs, 435 U.S.
at 695.
7 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ANTITRUST DIV., AN ANTITRUST PRIMER FOR FEDERAL
LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL 2 (2018) [hereinafter DOJ PRIMER], https://
www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/1091651/download [https://perma.cc/HTQ7-NTRL].
8 Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offs. of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 408 (2004).
9 Id.
10 See, e.g., D. Daniel Sokol, Policing the Firm, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 785,
785–88, 790–93 (2013); see also infra Part I.
11 See, e.g., John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, Cartels as Rational Business
Strategy: Crime Pays, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 427, 476–77 (2012) [hereinafter Crime
Pays]; see also infra Section III.B.
12 Crime Pays, supra note 11, at 430.
13 See infra notes 38–44 and accompanying text.
14 Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust “Treble” Damages Really Single Damages?,
54 OHIO ST. L.J. 115, 120–21 (1993) [hereinafter Antitrust “Treble” Damages].
15 See infra Part III; see also Scott D. Hammond, Recent Developments, Trends,
and Milestones in the Antitrust Division’s Criminal Enforcement Program, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUST. (Mar. 26, 2008), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/519651/download
[https://perma.cc/P63T-79L5].
16 See, e.g., Crime Pays, supra note 11, at 476–77; John M. Connor & Robert
H. Lande, Does Crime Pay? Cartel Penalties and Profits, ANTITRUST, Spring
2019, at 29 [hereinafter Does Crime Pay?]; Sokol, supra note 10.
6
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a single, simple rule that will radically shift the cost-benefit analysis
of both firms and the individual actors who compose them, drastically boosting the effectiveness of the cartel policing and punishment structure already in effect.
Part I of this Note reviews the current incentives of firms
and individuals to collude and the harm that collusion imposes
on society. Part II reviews the economic efficiency theory of cartel enforcement, known as the Chicago School, which has largely
dominated antitrust theory.17 It also adapts Robert Becker’s model
of criminal decision making into a “decision-making formula”
applicable to antitrust collusion.18 Part III reviews the burgeoning
new outlooks on cartel enforcement, or the Post-Chicago School,
including that private enforcement is more effective than previously
thought,19 the growing scholarship that advocates for increased
individual accountability,20 and the Department of Justice’s increased focus of individual prosecution.21 Part IV proposes a new
“per se” rule for policing cartel activity. Under this New Per Se
Rule, firms and firm executives would have per se liability in
civil actions when they or any of their employees are convicted of
a criminal antitrust violation. It then outlines how the New Per Se
Rule would effectively deter and police cartel activity by drastically
altering the decision-making formula of both firms and firm executives. Part V outlines the theoretical underpinnings of the New
Per Se Rule and its alignment with contemporary scholarship on
cartel enforcement and the Department of Justice practice.
I.THE REALITY OF COLLUSION AND ITS EFFECTS
Collusion is the “supreme evil” of antitrust because it enables what appears to be competitive markets to function as a
monopoly or near monopoly.22 Collusive companies combine into
a cartel and, through their aggregate market power, impose the
three evils: costs are artificially inflated, quality goes down, and
See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
Infra Section II.A.
19 Infra Part III.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offs of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 407–08 (2004).
17
18
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production is limited.23 The three evils are evils not only because
they force consumers to overpay, but because they destroy the
efficiency of the free market.24 In addition to creating allocative
inefficiencies, cartels decrease competition, which “insulat[es] inefficient manufacturers from the pressures of competition,” increasing
production costs and preventing innovation.25 Cartel activity is
illegal, and violators can face prison time and fines.26
Despite the risks that come with cartelization, cartels continue to form and operate.27 As eminent cartel scholars John M.
Connor and Robert H. Lande wrote, “[c]artels are a crime that ...
pays.”28 Christopher R. Leslie argues that price fixing in the
American market can be especially lucrative because the high
standards of proof required to prove collusion enable price fixers
to begin their cartel in a friendly market, build trust with each
other, and then expand into the American market with little chance
of prosecution.29 Moreover, the continuation of both public and
private actions brought against cartels proves that, for whatever
reason, cartels are still forming and operating.30
Regardless of the exact laws or circumstances that incentivize firms to collude, it is clear that the penalties and costs of
See supra notes 4–7 and accompanying text.
This inefficiency is known by economists as dead-weight loss. See generally
Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Damages and Deadweight Loss, 51 ANTITRUST
BULL. 521 (2006) (explaining deadweight loss and how antitrust law should
address the problem).
25 Christopher R. Leslie, Foreign Price-Fixing Conspiracies, 67 DUKE L. J.
557, 564 (2017) [hereinafter Foreign Conspiracies].
26 Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012)); U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8 (U.S. SENT’G
COMM’N 2018).
27 See, e.g., Brent Snyder, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just.,
Antitrust Div., Compliance is a Culture, Not Just a Policy (Sept. 9, 2014), https://
www.justice.gov/atr/file/517796/download [https://perma.cc/SL2D-C2U4] (Cartels
continue to form and operate despite “high fines for the company; significant jail
time for executives; expensive attorneys’ fees; substantial civil damages owed to
customers; and exposure to further criminal investigations—not to mention the
associated bad publicity and internal distraction from the actual business of the
company.”); Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Law as Public Interest Law, 28 U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. 885, 886 (2012) (reviewing a variety of modern cartels).
28 Crime Pays, supra note 11, at 430.
29 Foreign Conspiracies, supra note 25, at 614.
30 Crime Pays, supra note 11, at 433 n.25.
23
24
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being caught colluding are simply not high enough to outweigh
the millions of dollars in profits firms gain by their collusion.31 On
the one hand, the probability of a firm’s collusion being discovered
is less than one.32 On the other, even when cartels are identified,
a large number go without criminal prosecution due to a lack of
evidence.33 And when they are prosecuted, the costs the guilty
parties incur are often vastly too low to deter future collusion.34
Moreover, private actions against cartels are also woefully underpowered.35 Despite being authorized to recover treble damages
against price fixers, victims’ actual recoveries are often less than
their actual damages.36 As evidenced by the continuing formation of
cartels, these two factors—the possibility of never being caught
and low penalties if caught—combine to incur lower costs upon
collusive firms than gained through their collusion.37
The consequences of these cartels are significant.38 Although
hard to calculate exactly, one empirical study found that domestic
cartels overcharge by a median of 23.3% and international cartels
overcharge by a median of 30%, with an aggregate overcharge
31 See, e.g., Crime Pays, supra note 11, at 430 (“[T]he combined level of U.S.
cartel sanctions has been only 9% to 21% as large as it should be to protect
potential victims .... [D]espite all the existing sanctions, collusion remains a
rational business strategy.”); Sokol, supra note 10, at 790–92 (discussing the
high overcharge and low detection rates of cartels).
32 See infra Section II.A; see also Leslie, supra note 24, at 609–14 (discussing
how American courts have enabled cartels to form and build trust in a cartelfriendly jurisdiction, then expand into the American market and operate based
on trust, not enforcement mechanisms, and thus evade prosecution).
33 Direct evidence of price fixing is generally unavailable, forcing plaintiffs
and prosecutors to rely on circumstantial evidence. See In re Text Messaging
Antitrust Litig., 630 F.3d 622, 629 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Direct evidence of conspiracy is not a sine qua non, however. Circumstantial evidence can establish an
antitrust conspiracy.”); Christopher R. Leslie, Balancing The Conspiracy’s Books:
Inter-Competitor Sales and Price-Fixing Cartels, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 7 (2018)
(“Because price-fixing firms take great efforts to conceal their illegal activity,
direct evidence of price-fixing agreements is generally not available.”).
34 Crime Pays, supra note 11, at 476–77; John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande,
How High Do Cartels Raise Prices? Implications for Optimal Cartel Fines, 80
TUL. L. REV. 513, 559–64 (2005) [hereinafter How High?].
35 See generally Antitrust “Treble” Damages, supra note 14.
36 Id.
37 See Foreign Conspiracies, supra note 25, at 609–14; Crime Pays, supra
note 11, at 476–77.
38 See, e.g., Foreign Conspiracies, supra note 25, at 561 nn.16–18; How High?,
supra note 34, at 559–64.
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mean of 49%.39 These overcharges result in consumers paying billions of dollars in artificially inflated prices per year.40 The costs
of the allocative inefficiencies caused by cartels are less obvious
but also significant.41 Judge Easterbrook posited that the costs
of allocative inefficiency can be estimated at 50% of direct costs.42
Regardless of the exact costs imposed by the allocative inefficiency of price-fixing cartels, however, it suffices to say that these
costs are likely also in the billions of dollars per year.43 Likewise,
umbrella costs are similarly difficult to quantify. It is nonetheless sure, however, that umbrella costs exact at least some price
upon society by protecting inefficient actors and allowing firms
not part of the cartel to also raise prices.44
We are only able to estimate these figures because only
some cartels have been caught.45 It is impossible to quantify the
effects of yet undiscovered collusion.46 Whatever the precise dollar value of cartel harm may be, it is clear that our economy is
plagued with a nasty case of “the supreme evil.”47
II. THE ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY THEORY OF CARTEL ENFORCEMENT
The theoretical underpinnings of antitrust law have been
described as a battle between the Chicago School and the PostChicago School.48 Although this division might not be as clean-cut
Crime Pays, supra note 11, at 456–57.
Crime Pays, supra note 11, at 455–62; Foreign Conspiracies, supra note
25, at 564; Hammond, supra note 15, at 1.
41 See Crime Pays, supra note 11, at 433 n.22.
42 Frank H. Easterbrook, Detrebling Antitrust Damages, 28 J.L. & ECON.
445, 455 (1985).
43 See id.
44 Crime Pays, supra note 11, at 461–62; Foreign Conspiracies, supra note
25, at 565.
45 See How High?, supra note 34, at 518–19.
46 “Such cartels are common,” Gideon Mark, The Yates Memorandum and Cartel Enforcement, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 95, 96 (2018), and have “potentially
devastating effects on the U.S. economy”; DOJ PRIMER, supra note 7, at 1.
47 Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offs. of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
408 (2004). “The bulk of scholarly opinion is consistent with the view that despite ever-increasing levels of corporate fines and longer jail sentences, cartel
activity is currently under-deterred.” Douglas H. Ginsburg & Joshua D. Wright,
Antitrust Sanctions, 6 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 3, 9 (2010) [hereinafter Antitrust Sanctions].
48 See, e.g., William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix,
39
40
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as it first appears,49 it is certain that the Chicago School’s method
of economic analysis has had an “unmistakably profound” influence on U.S. antitrust law.50 This Part outlines the economic view
of cartel enforcement, including its rejection of private antitrust
actions. Part III will then outline contemporary, or Post-Chicago
School, views on cartel enforcement.
A. Economic Theory of Enforcement
In 1978, Chicago School scholar Robert Bork wrote that
total welfare, or surplus, is consumer welfare.51 This summation
of antitrust law, that its purpose is to enhance economic efficiency,
dominated the Chicago School’s antitrust enforcement theory.52
In the 1980s, William Landes put this understanding into a theoretical model of optimal deterrence.53 Landes’s model is built on
Robert Becker’s model of crime and punishment, which posits
2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 5, n.14 (2007) (describing both the author’s own
use of the Chicago/Post-Chicago dialectic and its use by other “academics,
practitioners, and enforcement officials”); D. Daniel Sokol, Cartels, Corporate
Compliance and What Practitioners Really Think About Enforcement, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 201, 201–02 (2012) [hereinafter Cartels, Corporate Compliance]
(noting that while the Chicago School has been “quite contentious,” its assumptions and policy prescriptions have been generally accepted).
49 See Kovacic, supra note 48, at 5–6.
50 Id. at 6. See also NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE
349 (1995) (“[T]here exists very little in the way of contemporary antitrust theory
which has not been inspired to some extent by Chicago economic analysis.”).
51 ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH
ITSELF 66, 97 (1978); see also Alan J. Meese, Debunking the Purchaser Welfare
Account of Section 2 of the Sherman Act: How Harvard Brought Us a Total
Welfare Standard and Why We Should Keep It, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 659, 691
(2010) (noting that Bork equated consumer welfare with the total welfare of
society); Barak Y. Orbach, The Antitrust Consumer Welfare Paradox, 7 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 133, 148 (2011) (“Bork explicitly equated the term
‘consumer welfare’ with ‘the wealth of the nation,’ a term that economists
would understand as ‘social welfare.’” (internal citations omitted)). See generally William E. Kovacic, The Antitrust Paradox Revisited: Robert Bork and
the Transformation of Modern Antitrust Policy, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1413 (1990)
[hereinafter Antitrust Paradox Revisited] for a discussion of Bork’s impact on
antitrust law.
52 Antitrust Paradox Revisited, supra note 51, at 1415–16.
53 See generally William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 652 (1983) [hereinafter Optimal Sanctions].
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that the purpose of criminal punishment is to deter inefficient
offenses, but not efficient ones.54 By the 1990s, Landes’s “Beckerian
formulation” of antitrust theory had been universally adopted by
scholars.55 The bottom line of Becker’s model is that an enforcement system so robust that it deters all crime is actually suboptimal.56 Optimally, crime that brings more benefits than harm
should be allowed to happen.57 Becker’s model can be simplified
and applied particularly to the decision to collude: the probability
of being caught (Pr) multiplied by the punishment (Pn), balanced
against the benefit (B) the criminal receives from the crime (all
expressed in constant dollars).58 Thus, when Pr * Pn = B, the
criminal’s net gain from their criminal activity is $0.59 If the Pr is a
perfect one, the Pn only needs to be equal to the benefits received to
deter the crime; the formula is reduced to Pn = B.60 As Pr goes
down, however, Pn needs to be increased to achieve actual deterrence.61 This Note will refer to this simplification of Becker’s
model as a firm or individual’s “decision-making formula.”
As applied by Landes to antitrust, the benefits (B) of some
antitrust crimes are more than just the increased profits to the
individual cartel members, but the social benefits realized by society
as a whole through greater economic efficiency.62 Some cartel
activities are beneficial because they bring more social benefits
(in the form of economic efficiencies) than they cost consumers in
overcharges and other ills.63 For example, a cartel may choose to
restrict output and thereby obtain cost savings of C.64 If C is
greater than the deadweight loss incurred by the output restriction,
Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J.
POL. ECON. 169, 207–08 (1968).
55 Crime Pays, supra note 11, at 431 n.15 (citing Richard A. Posner, Optimal
Sentences for White-Collar Criminals, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 409 (1980)).
56 See Optimal Sanctions, supra note 53, at 652–53.
57 Id.
58 See Becker, supra note 54, at 172–85 (formulating the model described
in this Note).
59 See id.
60 See id.
61 See id.
62 Optimal Sanctions, supra note 53, at 655–56.
63 See id.
64 Id. at 654–56.
54
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the output reduction is efficient—the cartel saves more money
than consumers overpay, and surplus is created.65 Punishment,
in the form of a fine on the cartel, greater than the sum of C and
the generated deadweight loss would negate the generated surplus and deter the behavior.66 This punishment, however, would
not be optimal because negating the surplus would also negate
the social benefits generated by the surplus.67
Thus, according to Landes, the optimal way to deter cartel
activity is to punish cartels with fines equal to the net harm imposed—the deadweight loss they generate.68 If cartel activity generates cost savings, C, greater than the harm imposed, a fine at the
level of net harm imposed will not deter the activity; if cartel activity does not create such a surplus, it will be deterred.69 Importantly, Landes also notes that his economic theory of cartel
deterrence applies even when a cartel does not have a 100%
market share.70
Landes’s model relies on three defining principles.71 First,
Landes’s model seeks to deter and punish the firm involved in
the collusion, not any human individual.72 It thus focuses on firms
as rational actors in and of themselves, rather than as a collection of agents that could be individually punished.73
Second, the means of punishment whereby deterrence is
achieved is—and can only be—monetary fines.74 Imprisonment
or other individual punishments are not possible to impose on a
firm. In agreement, Richard Posner posits that optimal punishment
consists almost exclusively through fines.75 Another scholar encapsulated the theory by saying that “very little now supports
Id.
Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 666–68.
71 See id. at 654–56.
72 See id.
73 See id.
74 See id.
75 Richard A. Posner, Optimal Sentences for White-Collar Criminals, 17
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 409, 410 (1980).
65
66
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the continued imposition” of punishments outside corporate fines
to achieve deterrence.76
Third, Landes’s model only seeks to deter and punish inefficient collusion.77 In other words, it avoids overdeterrence or
the deterrence of efficient collusion. This goal relies on firms to
examine the costs and benefits of colluding via their decisionmaking formula (including the chance of being caught and receiving punishment) and to make the rational decision, whether
that be to collude or not collude.78 Summarizing this principle of
Landes’s theory, Robert H. Lande wrote, “Optimal deterrence models are founded upon the assumption that the sole goal of antitrust is to enhance economic efficiency.”79
B. Criticisms of Private Actions
Given the goal of optimal deterrence, it comes as no surprise
that private class action suits for treble damages are disfavored
by those who subscribe to Landes’s economic theory of cartel enforcement.80 However, it is not that private lawsuits are necessarily
disliked on principle. Landes himself endorsed private antitrust
actions, believing that the incentive they give victims promotes
efficiency.81 Generally, optimal deterrence scholars would prefer
private suits to recover the net harm of inefficient cartels over
government enforcement.82 Rather, private suits are disliked because the combination of government prosecution and private treble damages suits combine to create overdeterrence.83 Expressing
V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?,
109 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1534 (1996).
77 See Optimal Sanctions, supra note 53, at 654–56.
78 See id.
79 Antitrust “Treble” Damages, supra note 14, at 127; see also WILLIAM
BREIT & KENNETH G. ELZINGA, ANTITRUST PENALTY REFORM, 4, 32–42 (1986)
(suggesting that all optimal deterrence models assume that efficiency is the
only legitimate goal of antitrust).
80 See, e.g., Bruce H. Kobayashi, Antitrust, Agency, and Amnesty: An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws Against
Corporations, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 715, 732–33 (2001).
81 See Optimal Sanctions, supra note 53, at 674–77.
82 See, e.g., Khanna, supra note 76 (“[F]rom a deterrence perspective, very
little now supports the continued imposition of criminal rather than civil liability on corporations.”).
83 See Kobayashi, supra note 80, at 732–33.
76
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this view, Richard Posner wrote that the “burgeoning of the private antitrust action has induced enormous, and I think justified, concern about the overexpansion of the antitrust laws and
their increasing use to retard rather than promote competition.”84 Michael Spence lamented that “[t]hings can get carried
away, and antitrust law can be used in ways that are not desirable ....”85 William Breit and Kenneth Elzinga posit that the
misallocation of antitrust penalties leads to three economic inefficiencies: perverse incentives, misinformation, and reparations
costs.86 “The most important and influential”87 critique of private
antitrust actions in the Chicago School era was by Phillip Areeda,
who proposed that treble damages should not be available unless plaintiffs proved that competition was actually reduced.88
These criticisms even caught the ear of the chairmen of the House
and Senate Judiciary committees, who both questioned the efficacy of private action treble damages.89
Contemporary criticisms of private antitrust actions are
also legion.90 One common refrain is that it is the attorneys, not
the plaintiffs, who really win because “administrative costs [often] swallow the entire recovery.”91 A former commissioner of
the FTC called private antitrust actions “almost as scandalous
as the price-fixing cartels that are generally at issue” and said
that “the plaintiffs’ lawyers ... stand to win almost regardless of
the merits of the case.”92 Another critic identified antitrust class
BREIT & ELZINGA, supra note 79, at 3 (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER,
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 35 (1976)).
85 Karen W. Arenson, From Economic Theory to Harvard Don, N.Y. TIMES,
April 1, 1984 (§ III), at 4; see also BREIT & ELZINGA, supra note 79, at 4, 69
nn.5–6.
86 BREIT & ELZINGA, supra note 79, at 36–42 (discussing each of the inefficiencies successively).
87 Kovacic, supra note 48, at 54.
88 Phillip Areeda, Comment, Antitrust Violations Without Damage Recoveries, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1127, 1129–30 (1976).
89 See BREIT & ELZINGA, supra note 79, at 4.
90 For a thorough discussion of the criticisms leveled at private antitrust
actions, see Joshua P. Davis & Robert H. Lande, Defying Conventional Wisdom:
The Case for Private Antitrust Enforcement, 48 GA. L. REV. 1, 38–78 (2013)
[hereinafter Defying Conventional Wisdom].
91 Daniel A. Crane, Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement, 63 VAND. L.
REV. 675, 683 (2010).
92 See J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks to the Antitrust Modernization Commission 9–10 (June 8, 2006), https://www.ftc.gov/sites
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actions as an area needing reform because “they are increasingly
beneficial only to plaintiffs’ law firms and not to consumers.”93 A
similar line of criticism claims that many private antitrust actions are unfounded.94 One such critic said, “many marginal and
even frivolous antitrust cases are filed every year, and antitrust
litigation is often used as a bargaining chip to strengthen the
hands of plaintiffs who really have other complaints.”95 Prominent antitrust attorney Abbot Lipsky pulled no punches when he
analogized private antitrust actions to the Salem Witch Trials.96
To be sure, the contemporary critics of private antitrust
actions also maintain concerns of overdeterrence.97 They fear
that private antitrust actions will discourage lawful and beneficial
competitive behavior.98 David Rosenberg and James P. Sullivan
argue that fines and prison terms imposed by public enforcement
reduce the need for treble damages.99 Other critics have called for
an end to treble damages as presently constituted.100 Even the ABA
Antitrust Section is wary of overdeterrence.101 Other authors
/default/files/documents/public_statements/antitrust-modernization-commission
-remarks/rosch-amc20remarks.june8.final.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z3PK-BSHT].
93 Q&A with Weil Gotshal’s Steven A. Newborn, LAW360 (May 26, 2009,
12:00 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/103359/q-a-with-weil-gotshal-s-steven
-a-newborn [https://perma.cc/WN4X-9DUP].
94 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND
EXECUTION 59 (2005).
95 Id.
96 See Lipsky, Jr., supra note 2, at 4–5.
97 See Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Benefits From Private Antitrust
Enforcement: An Analysis of Forty Cases, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 879, 884–85 (2008)
[hereinafter Benefits From Private Antitrust].
98 See, e.g., id. at 885–86, 885 n.29; Donald F. Turner, The Durability, Relevance, and Future of American Antitrust Policy, 75 CAL. L. REV. 797, 811–12
(1987).
99 David Rosenberg & James P. Sullivan, Coordinating Private Class Action
and Public Agency Enforcement of Antitrust Law, 2 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON.
159, 162 (2006).
100 See, e.g., John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Indirect Purchaser Suits
and the Consumer Interest, 48 ANTITRUST BULL. 531, 567–68 (2003) (“In light
of a more expansive corporate amnesty policy that increases the probability of
uncovering concealable antitrust violations, and hence reduces the magnitude
of the appropriate fine, the ceilings today may well be high enough that the
optimal penalty can be imposed through criminal sanctions alone.”); Kobayashi,
supra note 80, at 732–33.
101 “Whether increased criminal penalties will provide an appropriate level
of deterrence ... should be the subject of hearings and public briefings to
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claimed that “allowing cases to proceed toward trial or settlement under the threat of redundant or excessive damages [ ] is
untenable” and that action is needed to bring “sanity and stability back to antitrust law.”102 Another said that the private action
system is so flawed that it cannot be reformed, but must be
wholly replaced because it is existentially unsound.103
III.EMERGING VIEWS ON CARTEL ENFORCEMENT
A. The Implicit Rejection of Landes’s Economic Efficiency Theory
Each of the three defining principles of Landes’s model has
been rejected by contemporary views on cartel enforcement.104
Contrary to Landes’s assumption that all punishment should be
focused on the business entity, modern scholars have begun to
examine the efficacy of punishing the individual agents of the
corporation.105 Judge Douglas Ginsburg and Joshua D. Wright
argue that individual executives, even negligent ones, must be
punished to achieve optimal deterrence.106 They also argue that
debarment of individual corporate criminals would be an effective
solution,107 while others say that incarceration is the greater deterrent to individuals.108 Christopher Leslie argues that the agents
reach the proper deterrence balance.” AM. BAR ASS’N, COMMENTS OF THE ABA
SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW ON H.R.1086: INCREASED CRIMINAL PENALTIES,
LENIENCY DETREBLING AND THE TUNNEY ACT AMENDMENT 12 (2004), https://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/antitrust_law/comments
_increasedcriminalpenalties.pdf [https://perma.cc/SQ5P-3NWP].
102 Kyle W. Mach & Bradley E. Markano, The Problem of Duplicative Recovery Under Federal and State Antitrust Law, 23 COMPETITION: J. ANTITRUST &
UNFAIR COMPETITION L. SEC. ST. B. CAL. 105, 119 (2014).
103 Crane, supra note 91, at 676–77.
104 See supra Section II.A.
105 See, e.g., Gregory J. Werden et al., Deterrence and Detection of Cartels:
Using All the Tools and Sanctions, 56 ANTITRUST BULL., 207, 234 (2011) [hereinafter Deterrence and Detection] (arguing that the various forms of cartel punishment, including the prosecution of individuals, made the United States’
cartel enforcement program the most effective).
106 See Antitrust Sanctions, supra note 47, at 3.
107 Id. at 22.
108 Deterrence and Detection, supra note 105, at 234; see Christopher R.
Leslie, Cartels, Agency Costs, and Finding Virtue in Faithless Agents, 49 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1621, 1652–64 (2008) [hereinafter Faithless Agents] (arguing
that imprisonment has multiple advantages over fines and disbarment).
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of collusive firms should be punished for the purpose of increasing agency costs and destabilizing cartels.109
Other scholarship argues that compliance with antitrust
law can only be achieved though incentivizing firm executives to
implement effective, internal compliance programs.110 An analysis
of behavioral economics as applied to cartel enforcement posited
that firms will comply with antitrust laws only when the culture
of the firm changes and executives take antitrust violations seriously.111 Another scholar concluded that “[n]eo-Chicago antitrust
must embrace a more nuanced view of the firm” and “create appropriate incentives for individuals ... within the firm.”112
Also, contrary to the Landes model, the Department of
Justice prioritizes the deterrence of cartels through prosecution
of individuals.113 The Department does this because “individual
accountability through the imposition of jail sentences is the single
greatest deterrent” to cartel activity.114 The Department’s commitment to this strategy was reaffirmed in 2015 when Deputy
Attorney General Sally Yates issued what has come to be known
as the Yates Memorandum.115 The Yates Memorandum explained,
“[o]ne of the most effective ways to combat corporate misconduct
is by seeking accountability from the individuals who perpetrated
the wrongdoing. Such accountability ... deters future illegal activity
[and] incentivizes changes in corporate behavior ....”116 As part of
See generally Faithless Agents, supra note 108.
See Maurice E. Stucke, In Search of Effective Ethics & Compliance Programs, 39 J. CORP. L. 769, 825–27 (2014) [hereinafter Effective Ethics] (explaining
how an internal compliance program differs from an extrinsic, incentivebased approach).
111 See Maurice E. Stucke, Am I A Price Fixer? A Behavioral Economics
Analysis of Cartels, in CRIMINALISING CARTELS: CRITICAL STUDIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY MOVEMENT 263, 282–84 (Caron Beaton-Wells & Ariel
Ezrachi, eds. 2011).
112 Cartels, Corporate Compliance, supra note 48, at 236–37.
113 This practice began in the 1990s. See Mark, supra note 46, at 97.
114 Scott D. Hammond, Ten Strategies for Winning the Fight Against Hardcore
Cartels, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Oct. 18, 2005), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file
/517851/download [https://perma.cc/8LXR-P2GZ].
115 Memorandum from Sally Q. Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just.,
on Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing, 1 (Sept. 9, 2015), https://
www.justice.gov/archives/dag/file/769036/download [https://perma.cc/8FG4-XDJ3].
116 Id.; see also U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 9.28-210 (2018), https://
www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-28000-principles-federal-prosecution-business-orga
nizations#9-28.700 [https://perma.cc/4L9R-4GTF] (“Because a corporation can
109
110
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this turn towards individual accountability, the Antitrust Division now insists on jail sentences for all defendants—no longer
do they make “no-jail” deals.117 The Division also now prosecutes
multiple individuals from each corporate defendant, rather than
adhering to the prior practice of prosecuting only the single most
culpable individual.118
Recent scholarship has also rejected the punishment via
only monetary fines that Landes’s model requires.119 Werden,
Hammond, and Barnett explicitly reject reliance on monetary
punishment, arguing that it “follows from unsupportable assumptions.”120 Proposals that call for debarment and longer incarceration times also reject the exclusivity of monetary fines.121
Speaking of corporate punishment generally, one scholar argues
that corporations should be punished through incapacitation,
not merely fines.122 Longstanding Department of Justice practice of prosecuting and incarcerating individuals also rejects the
Landes model’s view of exclusive reliance on fines.123
Finally, the recent scholarship on cartel enforcement has
implicitly rejected the Landes model’s concerns of overdeterrence.124 Rather than outright arguing that all collusion should
be prevented regardless of economic efficiency, however, modern
scholarship focuses on the purported need for greater deterrence
simply to achieve optimal deterrence for economically inefficient
act only through individuals, imposition of individual criminal liability may
provide the strongest deterrent against future corporate wrongdoing. Provable
individual criminal culpability should be pursued, particularly if it relates to
high-level corporate officers, even in the face of an offer of a corporate guilty plea
or some other disposition of the charges against the corporation, including a
deferred prosecution or non-prosecution agreement, or a civil resolution.”).
117 Scott D. Hammond, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. for Crim. Enf’t, U.S. Dep’t
of Just., Antitrust Div., Remarks at the Nat’l Inst. on White Collar Crime: The
Evolution of Criminal Antitrust Enforcement Over the Last Two Decades, 7
(Feb. 25, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/518241/download [https://perma
.cc/MG5M-2R27].
118 Id. at 9–10.
119 See Deterrence and Detection, supra note 105, at 211.
120 Id.
121 See supra notes 104–09 and accompanying text.
122 W. Robert Thomas, Incapacitating Criminal Corporations, 72 VAND. L.
REV. 905, 963 (2019).
123 See Yates, supra note 115, at 4–5.
124 Deterrence and Detection, supra note 105, at 209.
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cartels.125 One empirical study found the U.S. Sentencing Guideline’s presumption that cartels overcharge by 10%126 far too low,
indicating that even if we only wanted to achieve optimal deterrence, we must drastically increase punishment to get there.127
John M. Connor and Robert H. Lande similarly found that cartels remain significantly under-deterred—sanctions are only 9.2
to 20.8% of their optimal level.128 Joshua D. Wright and Judge
Douglas Ginsburg also do not outrightly reject the notion of
overdeterrence, but rather believe that that one prong of the “optimal sanction for price-fixing” is “that the individuals responsible
for the cartel activity ... should be given a sufficient disincentive.”129
Following this line of implicit criticism, the Department of Justice
does not grant a defendant leniency in prosecution or sentencing
if they can show economic efficiency.130
B. New Appreciation of Private Actions
In recent years, there has been a growing body of scholarship in support of private antitrust actions.131 At the tip of the
spear lies Robert H. Lande, who began his defense of private antitrust actions in the height of the economic efficiency model’s
acceptance.132 In 1993, he asked if “treble” damages were actually
single damages.133 He concluded that rather than being treble,
antitrust damages are “approximately equal to, or less than, the
actual damages caused by antitrust violations.”134 Since this first
analysis, Lande has written a litany of articles analyzing cartels
and private actions against them.135 Lande and his co-authors
125 See, e.g., Deterrence and Detection, supra note 105, at 208–18; Crime Pays,
supra note 11, at 476–77.
126 U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2R1.1 cmt. n.3 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N
2018).
127 How High?, supra note 34, at 559–64.
128 Crime Pays, supra note 11, at 474.
129 Antitrust Sanctions, supra note 47, at 5 (emphasis in original).
130 See supra notes 113–18 and accompanying text.
131 See infra notes 135–41 and accompanying text.
132 See Crime Pays, supra note 11, at 431 n.15.
133 Antitrust “Treble” Damages, supra note 14, at 115, 120–21.
134 Id. at 118.
135 See, e.g., Does Crime Pay?, supra note 16, at 29; Robert H. Lande, Class
Warfare: Why Antitrust Class Actions Are Essential for Compensation and
Deterrence, ANTITRUST 81 (Spring 2016) [hereinafter Class Warfare]; John M.
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are not alone in their support of private antitrust actions. Many
scholars cite and build upon Lande’s work, including Joshua D.
Snyder,136 Mark A. Lemley,137 Christopher R. Leslie,138 D. Daniel
Sokol,139 Jens-Uwe Franck and Martin Peitz,140 and Steve Williams
and Elizabeth Tran.141 Lande’s work is particularly helpful, and
is focused on here, because he directly confronts the primary arguments against private antitrust actions142 and tests them
through empirical analysis.143
A common theme of Lande’s work in support of private
antitrust actions (and in the work of those that have followed
him) is the lambasting of critics who make their arguments
against private antitrust actions with no empirical evidence.144
Along with co-author Joshua P. Davis, Lande points out that
“[t]hose who point to the perceived flaws of private antitrust enforcement typically offer only anecdotes ... rather than provide
Connor & Robert H. Lande, Not Treble Damages: Cartel Recoveries Are Mostly
Less Than Single Damages, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1997 (2015) [hereinafter Not Treble]; Defying Conventional Wisdom, supra note 90, at 5–6; Joshua P. Davis &
Robert H. Lande, Toward an Empirical and Theoretical Assessment of Private
Antitrust Enforcement, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1269–70 (2013) [hereinafter Toward
Assessment]; Crime Pays, supra note 11, at 476–77; How High?, supra note
34, at 513; Antitrust “Treble” Damages, supra note 14, at 117–18. See generally
Robert H. Lande, U. BALT., http://law.ubalt.edu/faculty/profiles/lande.cfm [https://
perma.cc/A5UM-MTLJ].
136 Joshua D. Snyder, Tyson Foods And “Uninjured Class Members” in Antitrust Class Actions, 15 ANTITRUST SOURCE, Dec. 2015, at 1, 11–12.
137 Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Arbitration and
Merger Approval, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 48–49 (2015).
138 Id.; Christopher R. Leslie, Conspiracy to Arbitrate, 96 N.C. L. REV. 381,
454 n.393 (2018); Christopher R. Leslie, De Facto Detrebling: The Rush to
Settlement in Antitrust Class Action Litigation, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 1009, 1035
n.124, 1036 n.133, 1039 nn.147 & 149, 1045 n.175 (2008).
139 D. Daniel Sokol, The Strategic Use of Public and Private Litigation in Antitrust as Business Strategy, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 689, 691 n.11, 726 n.215 (2012).
140 Jens-Uwe Franck & Martin Peitz, Suppliers as Forgotten Cartel Victims, 15 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 17, 29 n.45, 38 n.64, 42 n.70, 43 n.77, 46 nn.84 &
87 (2018).
141 Steve Williams & Elizabeth Tran, Recoveries for Violations of Federal and
California Antitrust Statutes Should Not Be Apportioned, 23 COMPETITION: J.
ANTITRUST & UNFAIR COMPETITION L. SEC. ST. B. CAL. 95, 103 (2014).
142 See supra Section II.B.
143 See Toward Assessment, supra note 135, at 1271.
144 See, e.g., Benefits From Private Antitrust, supra note 97, at 887–89;
Robert H. Lande, Five Myths About Antitrust Damages, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 651,
651–52 (2006).
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reliable and rigorous data to support their arguments.”145 In
that same article, Lande and Davis analyze forty cases to conclude
that “private antitrust actions complement government enforcement ... . [and] may be every bit as essential as public enforcement.”146 In another empirical study, this one covering seventy-one
law review pages, Lande and Davis conclude that “the high success rate of government litigation suggests that in the absence of
private litigation, many bad actors would get away with violating the antitrust laws.”147 In 2015, Lande revisited his 1993 question148 and once again found through empirical analysis that
“cartel recoveries are mostly less than single damages.”149
These findings all undercut the argument that private antitrust actions lead to overdeterrence.150 Moreover, Lande has
tackled the question of optimal deterrence head on.151 In 2005,
he and John M. Connor found that the median overcharge by cartels is 25%: 17–19% by domestic cartels and 30–33% by international cartels.152 Thus, the presumption of the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines that cartels overcharge by 10% is substantially too
low—low enough that even if 100% of all cartels were caught,
optimal deterrence would still not be met.153 Seven years later,
the same duo found that “the overall level of anti-cartel sanctions is far too low. To protect victims optimally, the collective
level of existing sanctions should be multiplied by a factor of five.”154
Revisiting this study in 2019, Lande and Connor concluded that
“the most recent data re-affirm this conclusion.”155
See Benefits From Private Antitrust, supra note 97, at 887.
Id. at 905–06.
147 Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Comparative Deterrence from Private Enforcement and Criminal Enforcement of the U.S. Antitrust Laws, 2011
BYU L. REV. 315, 349 (2011) [hereinafter Comparative Deterrence]. But see
Deterrence and Detection, supra note 105, at 229 (calling Lande and Davis’s
study “more misleading than informative”). Lande and Davis rebut these critics in The Extraordinary Deterrence of Private Antitrust Enforcement: A Reply
to Werden, Hammond, and Barnett, 58 ANTITRUST BULL. 173 (2013).
148 See Crime Pays, supra note 11, at 431 n.15; Antitrust “Treble” Damages,
supra note 14, at 115, 120–21; supra text accompanying notes 132–33.
149 See generally Not Treble, supra note 135.
150 See supra Section II.B.
151 See How High?, supra note 34, at 514.
152 Id. at 559.
153 Id. at 561.
154 Crime Pays, supra note 11, at 476.
155 Does Crime Pay?, supra note 16, at 29.
145
146
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Not only do these findings refute the argument that private antitrust actions and the treble damages regime lead to
overdeterrence, they also refute the other primary critique of
private antitrust actions—that they are often frivolous.156 For
even if, arguendo, many private antitrust actions were frivolous,
the reality of cartel enforcement is that the punishments collusive
companies receive is far below the level of optimal deterrence.157
These frivolous lawsuits would help to make up the difference
between the actual levels of cartel enforcement and the optimal
level of cartel enforcement.158 Lande and Davis note at the conclusion of another study, however, that none of the cases they
studied involved an unmeritorious claim against the defendants.159
While they concede that their analysis is not wholly conclusive, they
assert that “there is no reason to believe otherwise.”160 Thus, the
data show that the fear of frivolous lawsuits is just that—a fear,
not reality.161
IV.INTRODUCING THE NEW “PER SE” RULE
This Note posits that the best way to more effectively deter
companies from colluding and to improve enforcement actions
against operating cartels is for Congress to introduce a new “per
se” rule of liability. This New Per Se Rule should make collusive
firms and their executives liable per se in private actions when
the firm or any of its agents are criminally convicted for violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.162 In other words, all executives of collusive firms should gain per se liability if their
firm becomes criminally liable for an antitrust violation, even if
they are not individually prosecuted. For the purposes of the
New Per Se Rule, criminal liability should be determined by both
guilty verdicts and guilty pleas against a firm or any of its agents.
The New Per Se Rule should also build upon the Department of
See supra Section II.B.
See supra notes 126–28 and accompanying text.
158 See id.; supra notes 145, 153 and accompanying text.
159 Comparative Deterrence, supra note 147, at 344–45; see also Class Warfare, supra note 135, at 81–82.
160 Comparative Deterrence, supra note 147, at 344–45.
161 See id.
162 Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012)).
156
157
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Justice’s existing leniency policy and allow the first executive of
a colluding firm who reports the firm’s collusive activity to the
Department of Justice to automatically receive immunity from
all liability, both criminal and civil.163 Collusive firms, however,
should not be able to receive immunity from the New Per Se Rule
for self-reporting.
A. Increased Pn Value
The New Per Se Rule will improve the effectiveness and
deterrent power of public antitrust enforcement by radically altering the results of firms’ and individuals’ decision-making formulas.164 The New Per Se Rule will alter firms’ and individuals’
decision-making formulas by drastically increasing the Pn variable
of the formula, or the punishment a convicted firm or individual
receives if prosecuted, by drastically increasing damages in private actions.165 Private antitrust actions against collusive companies are successful, but they do not actually recover the treble
damages they are entitled to.166 In reality, private antitrust awards
are often less than the actual damages.167 This disparity between
plaintiffs’ theoretical recovery and actual recovery is mostly due to
the costs and uncertainty of the litigation process, making underpowered settlements attractive.168 The New Per Se Rule will drastically increase the Pn value of the decision-making formula by
reducing the costs of private antitrust litigation and eliminating
nearly all uncertainty from the process, thus bringing actual awards
much closer to the treble damages plaintiffs are entitled to.169
Under New Per Se Rule actions, the defendant firms and
individuals will already be convicted of violating the Sherman
Act.170 Accordingly, the factual record will already be developed.
Moreover, the factual record will be proven beyond a reasonable
See U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 9-28.400(B) (2018).
An individual or firm’s decision-making formula is the Beckerian formulation of how a rational actor would decide whether or not to engage in
collusion. See supra Section II.A.
165 See supra Section II.A.
166 See supra Section III.B.
167 See supra Section III.B.
168 See supra Section III.B.
169 See supra Sections II.A, III.B.
170 See Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012)); supra text accompanying note 162.
163
164
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doubt—a higher standard than necessary to find liability in a
civil case.171 Because the facts are developed and the New Per Se
Rule will make defendants automatically liable on those facts as
a matter of law, the litigation process will be significantly shorter—
there will be no need for discovery unless the plaintiffs choose to
do so to seek additional damages. With a developed factual record and no additional discovery, New Per Se Rule suits will reach
judgment significantly faster than private actions currently do.172
Indeed, New Per Se Rule suits will usually be decided at summary
judgement, if not earlier on the pleadings.173 The treble damages
that plaintiffs are entitled to receive from the litigation will thus
cease to be discounted by the costs and uncertainty of long litigation,174 and rational plaintiffs will see the litigation through and
claim their treble damages, rather than taking an underpowered
settlement. Thus, the New Per Se Rule will drastically increase
the punitive and deterrent effects of private antitrust actions by
turning what are currently merely theoretical treble damages
into actual treble damages, thereby drastically increasing the Pn
value of the decision-making formula.175
This analysis also shows why other sanctions, such as longer
terms of debarment,176 disgorgement,177 and incarceration,178 are
insufficient methods to achieve a similar level of deterrence.179 Disgorgement does not increase the Pn value at all—it merely lowers
the B value, or the benefit a collusive firm receives.180 Debarment
does increase Pn for individual defendants, but only insofar as
the defendant executive is actually injured by the debarment.181
See Burden of Proof, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu
/wex/burden_of_proof [https://perma.cc/8QUC-D4BA].
172 Estimates of the average length of private antitrust suits range from
4.3 to 8.6 years. Antitrust “Treble” Damages, supra note 14, at 132–33.
173 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c). A motion for judgment on the pleadings is analyzed
under the same standard as a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Nat. Alts. Int’l, Inc.
v. Creative Compounds, LLC, 918 F.3d 1338, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
174 See supra Section III.B.
175 See supra note 134 and accompanying text; Section II.A.
176 See Antitrust Sanctions, supra note 47, at 22.
177 See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Disgorgement as an Antitrust Remedy, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 79, 79 (2009).
178 See, e.g., Deterrence and Detection, supra note 105, at 216.
179 See supra notes 106–08 and accompanying text.
180 See supra Section II.A.
181 See supra Section II.A.
171
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If a debarred individual gains employment with a salary similar
to what they could earn in the industry they are barred from,
they are not actually injured and their Pn value did not actually
increase.182 Moreover, if they are compensated by the firm they
colluded on behalf of, then subsequent employment is irrelevant—
they will not suffer an increased Pn by their debarment.183 Even
longer incarceration terms do not guarantee that an individual’s
Pn value actually increases, for the individual can be compensated
for their troubles with a small portion of the profits they reaped
through their collusion.184 Even without the possibility of indemnification, incarceration can only be achieved through the
criminal process.185 The New Per Se Rule imposes civil liability
on firms and firm executives who are not criminally convicted. This
enables the New Per Se Rule to deter them from colluding—to
impose a Pn value at all—even if a lack of evidence or government
resources precludes their criminal prosecution.
One author argues that “no economic sanction by itself can
effectively deter hard-core cartels”—that no Pn is big enough and
cartels can only be deterred if they are transformed into moral
issue.186 The New Per Se Rule recognizes that firm-only sanctions are insufficient and thus imposes New Per Se liability on
executives as well.187 However, if collusion really is the “supreme
evil,”188 economic sanctions should be increased through the New
Per Se Rule and cartels should be made a moral issue. Only then
can we be sure that colluding firms and executives have a sufficiently high Pn value to deter collusion.
B. Firms
The New Per Se Rule will deter firms from colluding and
forming cartels by radically altering each firm’s decision-making
See supra Section II.A.
See Keith N. Hylton, Deterrence and Antitrust Punishment: Firms Versus
Agents, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2069, 2076–77 (2015) (discussing firms’ ability to
indemnify employees who collude on their behalf).
184 See id.; supra Section II.A.
185 See Deterrence and Detection, supra note 105, at 216.
186 Maurice E. Stucke, Morality and Antitrust, 2006 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
443, 544–47 (2006).
187 See id.
188 Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offs. of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 408 (2004).
182
183
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formula. For firms considering collusion, the per se liability of the
New Per Se Rule will greatly increase the Pn value of their decisionmaking formulas.189 If caught, not only will a convicted company
face the penalties imposed by its criminal liability (something
unchanged by the New Per Se Rule), it will also face a much larger
civil penalty—treble damages.190 Because the civil damages a
convicted firm will face will be actually trebled, the New Per Se
Rule guarantees that a convicted collusive company will not only
lose all the profits it gained through its collusion, but it will also
have to pay an enormous fine equal to double its illegal profits.191 This civil penalty should be imposed in addition to the
criminal penalties that the convicted firm will face. Thus, the
New Per Se Rule will likely cause the Pn value of the decisionmaking formula for firms considering collusion to skyrocket and
will likely make collusive activity irrational for firms.192
However, because we do not know the exact probability of
a collusive company being caught and successfully prosecuted, we
cannot say that the increased Pn value of the New Per Se Rule
will definitively make collusion irrational in all circumstances. But
because the New Per Se Rule ensures treble damages if caught,
the decision-making formula essentially becomes Pr (the probability of being caught) * 3B, balanced against B (the benefits of
the collusion).193 In other words, the New Per Se Rule makes collusion irrational when a firm’s decision-making formula is:
Pr * 3B  B
Thus, when the Pr value is greater than 33%, or when a collusive
company has more than a 33% chance becoming subject to the New
Per Se Rule, the increased Pn value of the New Per Se Rule makes
collusion unprofitable and irrational.194 Moreover, this analysis
assumes that the Pn value of the firm’s criminal liability is zero.
See supra notes 58–61 and accompanying text.
The New Per Se Rule assumes that a private actor will always sue a
New Per Se Rule defendant.
191 Exact triplication may not be achieved because a company may be convicted on facts that do not constitute 100% of their collusive activity.
192 See supra notes 58–61 and accompanying text.
193 See supra Section II.A.
194 See supra Section II.A.
189
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Given that there will surely be some sort of criminal punishment
that gives rise to New Per Se liability, a firm’s actual decisionmaking formula includes that variable:
Pr * 3B + Pn[criminal]  B
Therefore, collusion actually becomes irrational at a Pr value
somewhere less than 33%.195
Of course, a firm considering cartel activity does not have
a sure calculation of their Pr value.196 A firm cannot perform a
calculation of their decision-making formula and its Pn and Pr
values with a high degree of certainty. Regardless of what a
firm’s Pr value actually is, or what it perceives it to be, the massive
Pn value that the New Per Se Rule creates means that if the
firm is actually prosecuted and subject to the Rule, it will suffer
enormous consequences.197 Thus, while the New Per Se Rule
may not always make collusion irrational according to a given
firm’s decision-making formula, it drastically increases the risks
of collusion. Firms considering collusion will have to reckon with
the possibility of suffering treble damages under the New Per Se
Rule and what that will mean for the firm. These high stakes
are raised even more by the leniency policies of the New Per Se
Rule: no leniency for firms, and immunity for the first executive
who reveals a firm’s participation in cartel activity.198 This leniency regime will force firms to consider the human elements of
their collusive partners and the likelihood of a defector. With so
many variables to consider, each being impossible to calculate to
a degree of certainty, the New Per Se Rule will turn collusion into
a high-risk game where firms stand to lose all of their extra profits
and more through actually realized treble damages.199 Thus,
even without a Pr value that guarantees collusive activity to be
irrational, the New Per Se Rule creates uncertainty and high
risk that will further deter firms from collusive activity.200
See supra Section II.A.
See supra Section II.A.
197 See supra Section IV.A.
198 See supra Part IV.
199 See supra Part IV.
200 See supra Part IV.
195
196
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C. Individuals
The New Per Se Rule will also deter individual executives
who control firms and firm agents from colluding by radically
altering their decision-making formulas. For individuals, the
New Per Se Rule alters both the Pn (punishment received) and
Pr (probability of being caught) values of the decision-making
formula.201 The Pn value of an individual’s formula increases for
the same reason a firm’s does. If caught, an individual will face both
criminal penalties and expensive, expedited civil liability. Rather
than civil liability for the treble of total damages, however, an
individual’s civil liability under the New Per Se Rule should be set
at a fixed percentage of the firm’s civil liability.202 This increased
Pn value will in turn boost the Pr value of individual decisionmaking formulas.203 It will do so because, under the New Per Se
Rule, the increased Pn value will increase the risk for executives
and other individuals.204 When an individual is approached by
law enforcement investigating the firm for collusive behavior,
the increased risk they face will make the individual more likely
to cooperate with law enforcement in order to avoid New Per Se
liability. Because the risk individuals face is higher, the payoff
they receive by mitigating that risk through cooperating with
law enforcement is also higher.205 In response to higher rates of
cooperation, rational enforcement officials will pursue individual
actors under the New Per Se Rule more often and with greater
vigor than they currently do, and the Pr value of individuals’ decision-making formulas will increase.206
See supra Part II.
The purpose of fixing individual liability as a percentage of the firm’s
liability is to make the fine a realistic one—a single individual would almost
never have the assets to pay a fine equal to the firm’s entire liability. The guiding
principle is that individual civil liability under the New Per Se Rule must be high
enough that engaging in collusive behavior is unprofitable, even if the individual’s
company indemnifies them, compensates them, or rewards them. The fine
should be predetermined to provide a sure deterrent effect. See Crime Pays, supra note 11. See also Hylton, supra note 183, for a discussion of firms’ willingness
to compensate or indemnify individuals who collude on their behalf.
203 See supra Section II.A.
204 See supra Section IV.A.
205 Supra Section IV.A.
206 Supra Section IV.A.
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With radically increased Pr and Pn values, the decisionmaking formula for individuals under the New Per Se Rule will be
significantly less favorable than it currently stands.207 Although
it is impossible to quantify an exact Pr or Pn value for an individual
in a colluding firm and thus impossible to definitively say that the
New Per Se Rule will make collusion irrational for any individual
actor, it can be said with confidence that individuals engaged in
or considering collusion face a much different calculation under the
New Per Se Rule.208 The chances of being prosecuted are greater
and the added civil liability makes the consequences, if caught,
much larger. Additionally, the benefits individuals receive from
their collusive behavior, B, are not likely to outweigh the risks.209
As an employee or executive of a collusive firm, there are rarely
any direct benefits from the employer firm’s collusion.210 The
benefits of collusion are increased profits, and those can only be
passed to an individual indirectly by the firm.211 In cases where
the firm has promised payment to individuals for their participation in collusion, the B value will be significantly lower than the
overall profits the firm will gain through the collusion.212 Although
each individual’s decision-making formula will be different, each
will face a large punishment in the Pn value, an increased risk
of prosecution in the Pr value, and little to no benefit in B.213
Even if an individual’s B value is high enough to make collusion
rational, the Pn value of the New Per Se Rule, a fixed amount of
the firm’s overall liability, is easily adjusted to make collusion
irrational again.214 Thus, the New Per Se Rule will make participating in collusive activity irrational for individuals.215
For executives of firms considering collusion, the Pn and
Pr values will skyrocket even more under the New Per Se Rule.216
The New Per Se Rule’s requirement that executives of convicted
companies gain per se civil liability most likely guarantees that the
Supra Section IV.A.
Supra Section IV.A.
209 Supra Section IV.A.
210 See supra Section IV.B.
211 Supra Section IV.B.
212 Supra Section IV.B.
213 See supra Section II.A.
214 Supra Section II.A.
215 Supra Section II.A.
216 See supra Part IV.
207
208
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executives of collusive companies will face personal consequences,
even if they are not individually prosecuted.217 In essence, the New
Per Se Rule adds a second Pr and Pn value to each executive’s decision-making formula: the probability that the firm, but not them
individually, is caught colluding and the punishment they will receive if so. It thus ceases to matter that the chances of individual
prosecution is low—the executives will suffer per se liability if
the company is caught at all.218 The decision-making formula for
an executive can thus be expanded to Pr * (Pn[company] +
Pn[personal]) balanced against B[company] + B[personal].219 If a
company perfectly indemnified a colluding executive to shield
them from Per Se liability, Pn[personal] would equal B[personal]
and would cancel out, making the executive’s decision-making
formula identical to the firm’s.220 A Pn[personal] greater than
B[personal], however, requires the Pr value to decrease proportionally to make the collusive activity rational for the executive
actor.221 Of course, the Pr value, the chances of the firm’s collusion
being discovered and prosecuted, does not decrease proportionally
to a firm executive’s personal risk.222 Thus, without perfect indemnification, the more a firm profits from its collusion, the
more Pn[personal] grows (because it is tied to the total award of
treble damages) and the more irrational collusion becomes for an
executive actor.223 Moreover, the Pn[personal] value is determined
by the percentage of the firm’s total liability that is imposed upon
each executive and, therefore, can be adjusted to ensure that it
is greater than B[personal] to the extent necessary to defeat indemnification and make entering the collusive activity irrational
for executive actors.224
In addition to deterring individuals and executives from
beginning collusive activity, the New Per Se Rule will aid the
detection and prosecution of operating cartels by changing individual and executive decision-making formulas.225 It is clear that
Supra Part IV.
Supra Part IV.
219 See supra Section II.A.
220 Supra Section II.A.
221 Supra Section II.A.
222 Supra Section II.A.
223 Supra Section II.A.
224 Supra Section II.A.
225 Supra Section II.A.
217
218

526 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:497
the Department of Justice’s leniency policy has aided in the detection and prosecution of cartels by incentivizing cartel members
to step forward and report the crime.226 The New Per Se Rule will
build upon this successful program by increasing the punishment
an individual faces if caught, thus increasing the payoff they receive by reporting the cartel under the New Per Se Rule’s leniency
program and thereby mitigating their personal risk.227 Simply
put, the increased personal risk disincentivizes engagement in
collusion since at-risk individuals and executives would want to
protect themselves.228 After the passage of the New Per Se Rule,
it is likely that a race to immunity would ensue as individuals
and executives realize that their participation in or complacency
with a cartel has now become irrational, as they realize that collusion no longer pays.
V.THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE NEW PER SE RULE
A. Rejecting Landes’s Economic Efficiency Theory
The New Per Se Rule rejects the three defining principles
of the Landes model, just as contemporary scholarship does.229
First, New Per Se liability applies to both firms and individuals.
Although the New Per Se Rule would impose a new punishment—New Per Se liability—it is hardly new in its focus on the
executives who direct collusive firms.230 Proposals advocating for
debarment and more incarceration, as well as the Department of
Justice policy of prosecuting individual executives, have a similar focus on non-firm actors.231 The New Per Se Rule is also in
See Hammond, supra note 15, at 3; see also Nathan H. Miller, Strategic
Leniency and Cartel Enforcement, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 750 (2009) (finding 60%
less cartel formation and 62% higher cartel detection because of leniency policies);
Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Amnesty, Game Theory, and Cartel Stability,
31 J. CORP. L. 453 (2006) (inquiring why the leniency policy is so successful and
suggesting changes to make it even more effective).
227 Cf. Faithless Agents, supra note 108, at 1698–99 (arguing that increased
prison sentences should be used to incentivize individual employees to report
collusive employers).
228 See supra Part IV.
229 See supra Section III.A.
230 See supra Part IV.
231 See supra Section III.A.
226
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harmony with the Yates Memo and its emphasis on the prosecution of individual actors.232
Second, the New Per Se Rule does not rely on fines alone
to achieve deterrence. Although New Per Se liability does not
include punishment outside of fines, it is designed to function as
an add-on to the current cartel enforcement regime, which relies
on criminal prosecution and prison sentences.233 Indeed, New
Per Se liability is triggered by criminal conviction and therefore
is inextricably linked to the threat of prison time.234
Finally, the New Per Se Rule rejects concerns of overdeterrence, just as contemporary scholarship rejects concerns of overdeterrence, not because of a disbelief in an efficiency exception
but rather because current deterrents are insufficient to achieve
even optimal deterrence.235
B. Focusing on the Root
The New Per Se Rule would be an effective deterrent of collusion because it focuses on the root actors of collusion, rather than
the amorphous firm.236 The New Per Se Rule alters the decisionmaking formula of firm executives more drastically than it alters
the decision-making formulas of non-executive individuals and of
the firm itself.237 Contrary to Landes’s theory of cartel enforcement,
this focus on individual actors is a feature, not a bug, of the New
Per Se Rule.238 It follows the scholarly and Department of Justice
trend towards prosecuting individuals and changing incentives.239
More importantly, however, the New Per Se Rule will deter collusive behavior because it targets the root of the problem: executives
with perverse incentives.240 The increased focus by the scholarship and Department of Justice on individual incentives recognizes that firms cannot act independently of their executives.241
Supra Section III.A.
See infra Section V.D.
234 See supra Part IV.
235 See supra Section III.A.
236 See supra Part IV.
237 Supra Part IV.
238 Supra Part IV.
239 Supra Part IV.
240 See supra Part IV.
241 See supra Section III.A.
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However rational collusion might be for a firm, the firm, as a collection of assets, cannot act upon the opportunity to cartelize—
only those in control of firm assets can perform the required acts
to collude.242 And when the executives of a firm do collude, they
do not collude with merely a collection of assets. They collude
with the executives in control of those assets.243
The Sherman Act itself implicitly acknowledges that firms
cannot act for themselves, but only through their controlling executives.244 Else, rational firms could not make the economically
irrational choice to obey the law.245 Thus, law anticipates it as a
violation by individual actors, and therein lies the real criminal:
the executive who leads the firm into collusion. This logic has
been called an “accountability gap” and one scholar stated that
“[t]he urgency of the accountability gap is real,” and “[f]ailure to
address [it] will further undermine public trust.”246 The same
scholar argued that criminal remedies will fail and only civil
remedies can fix the accountability gap.247 Another scholar conceptualizes the accountability gap as agency costs and argues
that agency costs should be exacerbated to incentivize agents of
collusive firms to report and destabilize cartels.248 Regardless of
vocabulary, the New Per Se Rule’s focus on individual actors follows the Sherman Act and contemporary scholarship in its focus
on individual executives.249
The New Per Se Rule’s particular impact on executives is
thus a strike at the heart of the “supreme evil” of collusion.250 Even
if the decision-making formulas for firms and non-executive individuals indicate that collusion is rational under the New Per
Se Rule (a plausible scenario, though unlikely, under the New
Per Se Rule),251 if the decision-making formula for firm executives
See supra Part IV.
Supra Part IV.
244 Supra Part IV.
245 Supra Part IV.
246 Gregory M. Gilchrist, Individual Accountability for Corporate Crime, 34
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 335, 338–40 (2018).
247 Id. at 380–87.
248 Faithless Agents, supra note 108, at 1652–64.
249 See supra Part III.
250 Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offs. of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 408 (2004).
251 See supra Part IV.
242
243
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determines that collusion is irrational for them as individuals,
then they—and, accordingly, the firm—will not collude.252 The
New Per Se Rule also makes it easy to ensure that executives’
decision-making formulas always dictate that collusion is irrational: the dollar value of an executive’s per se liability can be
raised and lowered through adjusting the percentage of firm liability that an executive becomes liable for.253 This direct impact
on individual executives’ decision-making formulas also insulates
New Per Se liability from being nullified by indemnification or
reimbursement, ensuring that the New Per Se Rule actually operates on and deters the root actors of collusion.254 Finally, this
focus on executive action and incentives, rather than the firm,
carries another benefit: it incentivizes firm executives to implement antitrust compliance programs within their firms.255
C. Making Corporate Compliance Rational
Perhaps the most powerful effect of the New Per Se Rule
on collusive behavior lies not in its power to punish, but its power
to prevent. By imposing liability on the executives of collusive firms,
the New Per Se Rule will not only deter executives from beginning
collusive activity, but will incentivize them to actively police their
firm to ensure that collusion does not happen at any level.256
Scholarship on corporate compliance has recognized that this kind
of incentive is necessary for internal compliance schemes to work.257
And when compliance programs are enacted, they are effective at
policing behavior within firms.258 Speaking of compliance programs
Supra Section IV.B.
See Crime Pays, supra note 11, at 431 n.15; Antitrust “Treble” Damages,
supra note 14, at 115, 120–21; supra text accompanying notes 132–33, 148.
254 See Douglas H. Ginsburg et al., Opinion, DOJ Has the Power to Crush
Price-Fixers, USA TODAY (May 27, 2015, 12:39 PM), https://www.usatoday.com
/story/opinion/2015/05/27/currency-manipulation-cartels-doj-antitrust-column
/27920795/ [https://perma.cc/A4F5-2NGW] (recommending that the Department of
Justice insist that convicted employs are not compensated by their employer).
255 See supra notes 110–12 and accompanying text.
256 Supra Section IV.C.
257 See supra notes 90–92 and accompanying text.
258 See Max Huffman, Incentives to Comply with Competition Law, 30 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REV. 108, 117 (2018), for a discussion of which actor can most
effectively enact compliance programs, concluding that firms are “best able to
adopt systems to prevent law-breaking.”
252
253
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that reward internal whistleblowers, one piece of literature studied
empirical evidence and concluded that “the available data do suggest that an ethics program ... can effectively prevent and deter
criminal conduct.”259 Another theory suggests that compliance officers within firms are “far from powerless” and can “drastically
alter directors’ and officers’ liability calculus.”260
Under the current Sentencing Guidelines, firms can receive
credit for having a compliance program and what constitutes a
compliance program is defined.261 However, firms do not have
the proper incentives to actually maintain these kinds of programs and ensure that no one within the firm is colluding. And
accordingly, they do not implement and use them.262 One—if not
the most—direct way of changing the views and incentives of executives, as these proposals suggest should be done, is to punish
the executives directly rather than letting them hide behind the
firm they command.263 The New Per Se Rule does this by holding firm executives—who have the power to implement and
maintain such a compliance system—accountable for any collusion that happens within their firm.264 The New Per Se Rule will
thus incentivize firm executives to build robust compliance programs and prevent collusion from happening in the first place.265
Effective Ethics, supra note 110, at 794.
Stavros Gadinis & Amelia Miazad, The Hidden Power of Compliance,
103 MINN. L. REV. 2135, 2156–57 (2019).
261 U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018);
see In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 969 (Del. Ch.
1996) (observing the Guidelines’ “powerful incentives for corporations today
to have in place compliance programs to detect violations of law, promptly to
report violations to appropriate public officials when discovered, and to take
prompt, voluntary remedial efforts”); Sokol, supra note 10, at 819 n.177.
262 Effective Ethics, supra note 110, at 782–91; Sokol, supra note 10, at 800–03.
263 Supra Section III.A.
264 See supra Part IV.
265 An additional benefit of incentivizing firms to promote internal compliance is that it leaves the legwork of developing an effective compliance system to
the private sector. The New Per Se Rule should be implemented in a way that
allows judicial review of sufficiency, while allowing the creative power to remain
with the firms. Such a framework could be adopted from the current U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, specifically at chapter 8B2.1. It should also be noted that
sentencing data does not indicate judicial error in applying Guidelines and
reviewing the sufficiency of compliance programs. Effective Ethics, supra note
110, at 799.
259
260
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This compliance-promoting effect of the New Per Se Rule aligns
with what the Department of Justice has identified as a best practice, saying “compliance programs make good sense—both good
common sense and good business sense. Compliance programs help
prevent companies from committing crimes in the first place.”266
It also aligns with the purpose of treble damages remedies in
general, which is “not merely to provide private relief, but[,] to
serve as well the high purpose of enforcing the antitrust laws.”267
Thus, the powerful punishment of the New Per Se Rule’s
automatic liability will most likely change executives’ incentives
and induce them to refrain from collusion in the first place and
implement robust compliance programs within their firms.268 In
addition to the threat of increased punishments, however, the New
Per Se Rule should provide another incentive to firm executives to
police themselves through robust compliance programs: limited
immunity from New Per Se liability when non-executive employees
engage in collusion despite a sufficiently robust compliance program. This exception will protect executives who implement adequate compliance programs in good faith. It also will provide
further incentive to implement a robust compliance program.
Moreover, this exception follows current Department of Justice
policy of considering compliance programs as a basis for leniency.269
If concerns of overbroad New Per Se liability persist, the New
Per Se Rule could also grant immunity to executives or employees
who report collusive activity through an internal whistleblower
reporting system that is part of a firm’s internal compliance program. Such immunity, if given, should be monitored to ensure it
is not abused.
Snyder, supra note 27, at 3; see also Effective Ethics, supra note 110, at
792 (“One empirical issue is whether ethics programs can effectively prevent
and detect crimes, and if so, the extent of their effectiveness. One positive
trend is the increase over the past 30 years in empirical work on business
ethics. The empirical studies suggest that the Guidelines are on the right
track: firms can prevent and deter unethical and illegal behavior by promoting an ethical organizational culture.” (internal citations omitted)).
267 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Resch., Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130–31 (1969).
268 See supra Section IV.C.
269 See Snyder, supra note 27 (“Even if they fail to do so, partially successful compliance programs may help companies qualify for leniency.”).
266
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D. Addressing Counterarguments
A critic of the New Per Se Rule may object on the grounds
that it deviates from the optimal punishment model and will deter efficient breaches—that it will over-deter.270 As discussed in
Part III, contemporary scholarly literature has rejected overdeterrence concerns, at least insofar as the evidence shows that
current cartel sanctions are insufficient to deter all economically
inefficient offenses.271 The New Per Se Rule follows this literature
and is premised on the evidence that current cartel sanctions are
insufficient to deter economically inefficient collusive behavior
among firms.272 Moreover, current Department of Justice policy
has already rejected overdeterrence as a guiding principle of antitrust enforcement.273 So long as that is the paradigm within
which we are operating, continuing to disregard optimal deterrence concerns does not create a net negative.274 Even more, the
New Per Se Rule is not totally incompatible with efficient breach.
An exception that allows immunity from New Per Se liability if
the collusion was economically efficient would resolve overdeterrence concerns while preserving the deterrent power of the New
Per Se Rule in relation to inefficient collusion.275
Critics may also point out that the New Per Se Rule does
not actually change anything about antitrust enforcement because
it only comes into play after a criminal conviction or plea agreement; existing Department of Justice enforcement policies and
their well-founded reasons lay unchanged.276 Just because Department of Justice policy is not changed directly by the New Per Se
Rule, however, does not mean that antitrust enforcement will stay
the same. The New Per Se Rule fundamentally changes the game
by increasing the risks of collusion for firms, their executives,
and other individuals.277 The drastically increased punishments
See supra Section III.A.
See supra Section III.A.
272 See supra notes 124–30 and accompanying text.
273 See supra notes 91–96 and accompanying text.
274 See supra notes 91–96 and accompanying text.
275 Such an exception could easily be added to the New Per Se Rule’s leniency policy. For a discussion of that policy, see supra Part IV.
276 See supra Part III.
277 See supra Part IV.
270
271
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all these parties will receive under the New Per Se Rule, as expressed in the Pn value of their decision-making formulas, will
likely change how they act in any given situation. In response,
Department of Justice enforcement actions will likely also change.
For example, the New Per Se Rule increases the risk for individuals
and executives engaged in collusive behavior.278 The increased
risk will incentivize individuals to cooperate with investigating
law enforcement officials, and in turn will incentivize law enforcement officials to dedicate more resources to pressuring and prosecuting individuals.279 Thus, even though it makes no formal
changes to Department of Justice antitrust enforcement policies,
the New Per Se Rule will change the enforcement landscape, deterring collusive activity and increasing the effectiveness of enforcement actions.280
Another concern with the New Per Se Rule may be punishing
firm executives for collusive actions that they did not take part
in, whether committed by executives or other individuals within
the firm.281 With regards to liability for actions committed by
non-executives within the firm, holding executives accountable
prevents them from turning a blind eye to collusive behavior and
is an essential element of the New Per Se Rule.282 Such accountability incentivizes those executives to implement robust compliance programs to police the behavior of individuals within their
firm.283 If firm executives do implement such a compliance program, the New Per Se Rule allows them to be immune from liability
for the actions of non-executive individuals.284 With respect to
collusion performed by other executives, New Per Se liability
once again incentivizes firm executives to police the behavior of
their firm with some sort of compliance system—this is intentional.285 Executives are in the best position to police the behavior
See supra Section IV.C.
See supra Section IV.C for a more robust discussion of how the New
Per Se Rule will change the incentives for individuals and law enforcement
officials during investigation.
280 See supra Part IV.
281 See supra Section IV.C.
282 See supra Section IV.C.
283 See supra Section V.C.
284 Supra Section V.C.
285 See supra Section IV.C.
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of other executives.286 Imposing per se liability on all executives
if the firm colludes at all prevents the firm from designating a
sacrificial lamb of sorts and incentivizes firm executives to meaningfully police each other’s actions.287 Moreover, if an executive is
worried about being personally liable for another executive’s behavior under the New Per Se Rule, they can gain immunity
through the Rule’s leniency program.288
Finally, the New Per Se Rule may cause cartels to clamp
down on their members, improve the cartel’s internal enforcement mechanisms, and ultimately make collusive activity harder
to police.289 The high risks created by the New Per Se Rule, however, heavily incentivize executives (and other individuals) to defect on the cartel when it comes under legal scrutiny.290 And with a
cooperative insider, law enforcement will be much more likely to
effectively investigate and prosecute the cartel, despite the cartel’s best effort to clamp down on its members.291 Relatedly, since a
guilty plea triggers New Per Se liability, individuals and firms
may be less willing to plead guilty when indicted.292 Indeed, pleading guilty may be out of the question for most firms. If they
choose to proceed to trial, however, they will also be surrendering the reduced criminal punishment that comes from pleading
guilty.293 Because so few antitrust cases proceed to trial, it is
impossible to discuss the success rate of trials if New Per Se liability caused a spike in trials.294 Considering, however, that there
will most likely be at least one cooperating insider, the government
likely will not have trouble assembling strong cases against discovered cartels.295 Moreover, with pleading off the table there will
be much more uncertainty for both firms and individual defendants,
See supra notes 110–12 and accompanying text.
Hylton, supra note 183, at 2082 (citing Crime Pays, supra note 11, at
440–41 n.54).
288 See U.S. Dep’t. of Just., supra note 163.
289 See supra Section IV.C.
290 See supra Section IV.C.
291 See supra Section IV.C.
292 See supra Part IV.
293 Donald J. Newman, Pleading Guilty For Considerations: A Study of
Bargain Justice, 46 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 780, 783–84 (1956).
294 Fred A. Freund, The Pleading and Pre-Trial of an Antitrust Claim, 18
SECTION ANTITRUST L. 15 (1961).
295 See supra Section IV.C.
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which will further incentivize executives to institute internal compliance programs and thus avoid the risk altogether.296
CONCLUSION
Despite criminal enforcement and treble damages available
in private suits, firms still engage in collusive activity.297 These
cartels manipulate the free market to overcharge consumers billions of dollars per year, impose allocative inefficiencies, and create
umbrella costs.298 Traditional Chicago School of thought has derided the treble damages remedy available in private antitrust
actions, fearing that it promotes frivolous suits and causes overdeterrence.299 The recent analyses of anti-cartel enforcement activities, however, have demonstrated that the enforcement landscape
is different than previously thought.300 Specifically, this literature has shown that private antitrust actions are more effective
and less harmful than traditionally thought, yet still fall far short of
actually awarding treble damages.301 Moreover, the literature
shows that the combination of public and private action does not
adequately deter cartel activity, even according to optimal deterrence models.302 In addition to rejecting concerns of overdeterrence,
contemporary scholarship rejects the Chicago School’s reliance
on monetary fines leveled only against the colluding firm.303 This
shift, away from William Landes’s model of economic efficiency
and towards individual accountability, has also manifested itself
in Department of Justice policy, which has increasingly emphasized prosecution of individuals within collusive firms.304
The combination of public and private cartel enforcement
is woefully failing at deterring and policing collusion between
firms and its harmful effects.305 In order to lessen the power that
the “supreme evil” of antitrust holds over our economy, Congress
See supra Part IV.
See supra Part I.
298 See supra Part I.
299 See supra Section II.B.
300 See supra Section III.B.
301 See supra notes 146–49 and accompanying text.
302 See supra notes 124–30, 150–55 and accompanying text.
303 See supra notes 119–23 and accompanying text.
304 See supra notes 113–18 and accompanying text.
305 See supra Part I.
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should pass legislation creating a New Per Se Rule that makes
firms and executives of firms liable per se in civil antitrust actions
when the firm or any of its employees is criminally convicted of
collusive activity. New Per Se liability would radically change
the decision-making formulas of both firms and executives by
transforming what is now less than single damages awarded in
private antitrust actions into actual treble damages.306 Thus, the
New Per Se Rule will make collusion irrational for both the firm
and firm executives. Moreover, New Per Se civil liability will strike
at the root of the problem: executives with perverse incentives and
will change the outcome of their rational decision-making calculations.307 It will also incentivize firms to create robust compliance
programs to ensure that the firm does not engage in collusive
activity on any level.308 Finally, potential counterarguments either mistake the New Per Se Rule’s strengths for weaknesses or
do not account for the presence of a cooperative insider who has
defected under the New Per Se Rule’s leniency policy.309
Firms and firm executives are rational decision makers.
Only when collusion is irrational will the “supreme evil” of collusion cease to plague our economy. The New Per Se Rule will
make collusion irrational for both firms and the individual executives who command them.
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